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Wittgenstein and Heidegger: on Use 
 
It is well-known that since the end of the 1970’s, a prolific tradition of comparison has 
undertaken to highlight the similitudes between the work of those two major contemporary 
philosophers that are Wittgenstein and Heidegger. To present it shortly, we could say that a first 
wave of comparison has consisted in reading Heidegger using a set of “pragmatic” 
Wittgensteinian intuitions. Richard Rorty for instance has undertaken to underline some 
“pragmatics” intuitions in Heidegger from a Wittgensteinian point of view in his Philosophy and 
the Mirror of Nature from 1979 and in his some important papers. Charles Taylor’s 
Philosophical Papers from 1985 and Philosophical Arguments from 1995 and above all Hubert 
Dreyfus’s 1991 Being-in-the-World take place in a similar move. There work had a huge 
influence on numerous Heidegger’s scholars like John Haugeland and Robert Brandom (to be 
very selective).  
Apart from this fist wave of comparison, it is also possible to distinguish a second historical 
wave of comparison which undertook to read Wittgenstein from a Heideggerian point of view. As 
an example, I could mention Stanley Cavell’s (especially in his Voice of Reason from 1979 or in 
his work about Emerson) and Stephen Mulhall’s more recent work.  
But my today purpose is not to analyse the history of this comparison. I would rather focus on 
one of the argument traditionally used for justifying the comparison between Wittgenstein and 
Heidegger: the way both philosophers deal with the notion of “use”. It seems obvious that 
Heidegger, like Wittgenstein, pay indeed attention to our daily environment of use which 
determines our ordinary practices. However I seek to show that the two approaches differ 
profoundly in their understanding of what such a “use” is. In doing so, I hope to underline the 
importance of the ontological dimension of Heidegger’s phenomenology and, on the contrary, to 
cast a new light on Wittgenstein’s method, and particularly on the famous thesis of the 
Philosophical Investigations §43: “the meaning of a word is its use in the language”. (quotation 
1) 
 
I will start with the analyse of Heidegger’s way of dealing with the notion of “use”.  
As early as in his first Freiburg Lessons, Heidegger asserts that life relates to its world of 
concern not in a theoretical way but in a way which is commensurate to what life needs. In the 
famous analysis included in Heidegger’s 1919 Kriegsnotsemester §14, Heidegger shows that the 
perception of every object – of an academic “pulpit” in his example – depends on how it is 
perceived: in different ways according to which the perceiver uses it. (That is the second 
quotation of the hand-out. It is a German one because I didn’t find the English version) 
 Against Husserl, Heidegger argues that the “pulpit” that I perceive cannot be reduced to a 
theoretical object that I have to describe as having such and such properties (as coloured, squared 
and so on…). According to Heidegger, I see the “pulpit” as used as a pulpit, that means that I do 
not see at first a brown pulpit but I immediately understand that it is professor pulpit that as to be 
used for teaching, that it is to high for my small size, to far from the microphone, etc. So, in 1919, 
Heidegger introduces already the idea that the experience of perception is always “oriented” in a 
“background” of primary (pre-linguistic) signification. Before seeing the pulpit, I understand how 
it has to be used. Conversely, if I do not understand the sense of its determining background (the 
seminar room), I will understand differently how to use it. Heidegger famously mentioned the 
case of the Black-Forest farmer or of the native Senegalese: both would not use and then not 
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understand similarly the pulpit. They would think that it is a protection wall against arrows or 
anything else but the main point, according to Heidegger, is that they will always think that it has 
a meaning that depends from the way it will be used: in any case, their perception of the pulpit 
will depend on how they could understand and use it. As a consequence, Heidegger points out 
that our relations to our everyday environment are use relations.  
More fundamentally, in the first chapters of his 1927 Being and Time, Heidegger suggests to 
generalise the category of “use” considering that all the “readiness-to-hand” (Zuhandenheit) with 
which the Dasein deals has to be compared to Zeuge, that is to “stuff”, or to what the French 
translators translate as “tools”. It means that the Dasein relates to all wordly stuff as something 
which can be used. According to Heidegger, the Dasein uses chairs but also classroom, university, 
state and even the environment in which those elements take place. Sein und Zeit §17 clarifies the 
point in highlighting the ontological and categorical structure of these Zeuge: they deserve their 
own ontological structure and this structure is precisely called the “utility-for”. As a consequence, 
Heidegger asserts that the “readiness to hand” stuffs of the Dasein’s environment are 
ontologically structured by their “utility”. It means that the ordinary relation of the Dasein to the 
daily stuffs is a “use-relation”. 
 
My today point is that, on the contrary, it is far from obvious that Wittgenstein accepts such an 
extension and generalisation of the notions of use and tools. It is true that Wittgenstein pays 
attention to how we use in context language signs. This is obvious, for instance in the Blue Book 
(quotation 3): “if we had to name anything which is the life of the sign, we should have to say 
that it was its use”. Several times, Wittgenstein states, for instance in the Blue Book, that “it is the 
particular use of a word which gives the world its meaning” (quotation 3 too). He then highlights 
that a word has a meaning only in our ordinary practices. By the way, in the §17 of the 
Philosophical Investigations, he famously compares the different categories of words to the 
categories of tools in a tools box. I quote: « think of the different points of view from which one 
can classify tools or chess-men” (quotation 4). In the Blue Book, the organization of tools is also 
a model for thinking the organization of words: “Think of words as instruments characterised by 
their use, and then think of the use of a hammer, the use of a chisel, the use of a square, of a glue 
pot and of the glue” (quotation 4 too). Such organization directly depends on for what stake we 
will use the different tools. For instance, it could have some sense to associate the glue et the 
ladder in some context (in order to fix a poster on a wall for instance) but not in some other. As a 
consequence, it is true that Wittgenstein pays a special attention to different tools in the world, 
for instance to the “hammer” in the Blue Book.  
Following these indications, it seems relevant to compare Wittgenstein’s interest for the notion 
of “use” to Heidegger’s interest for the notion, for instance for the “use of the hammer” in the 
paragraph 15 of Being and Time. But looking more precisely both analyses of the notion of 
“hammer”, we can notice that there is a fundamental discrepancy between the two philosophical 
methods. Contrary to Heidegger that intends to characterize the ontological structure of the 
readiness-to-hand that is the hammer, Wittgenstein only intends to clarify the different aspects of 
the sign “hammer” in the language, that is how it is used in the language. That is precisely this 
difference between an ontological concept of use and a methodological and localised one that I 
intend to interrogate now in order to outline the discrepancy between Wittgenstein’s 
philosophical method and Heidegger’s hermeneutical one. 
 
I. Two notions of “use”: an ontological and a grammatical one 
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In order to specify this discrepancy, I now suggest to analyse very carefully the way the so-called 
« second Wittgenstein » uses the notion of “use” in the Blue Book and in the Philosophical 
Investigations. 
As a beginning, we can notice that in all Wittgenstein quotations, Wittgenstein is exclusively 
interested in the “use” of language signs. The idea of “tools” is only used as a comparison, in 
order to clarify how language signs work. It seems clear that Wittgenstein’s analysis of the “use” 
has no ontological dimension. One of the Blue Book quotation (quotation 5) testifies that 
Wittgenstein is very reluctant to every move that consists in substantializing the notion of use. I 
quote: 
“The mistake we are liable to make could be expressed thus: We are looking for the use of a 
sign, but we look for it as though it were an object co-existing with the sign. (One of the 
reasons for this mistake is again that we are looking for a “thing corresponding to a 
substantive”). 
 
We can deduce from this quotation that Wittgenstein does not consider the way we use things as 
the paradigm of the notion of “use” he is interested in. He only underlines the fact that we use 
some language signs but not every world object and even less the world itself.  
If we consider the way the notion of “use” is introduced in the proposition 3.326 of the Tractatus, 
we notice that, soon in the Tractacus, Wittgenstein only considers the “use” of signs (quotation 
6): “In order to recognise a symbol by its sign we must observe how it is used with a sense ».The 
use of the sign makes it alive and transforms it into a symbol.  
In the very famous §43 of the Philosophical Investigations in which the notion of “use” is 
famously re-introduced, Wittgenstein also speaks of the use of “word”: “For a large class of 
cases – though not for all – in which we employ the word “meaning” it can be defined thus: the 
meaning of a word is its use in the language. (PI, §43) (quotation 1) 
 
It means that in order to understand the signification of a “word” and to look after its sense, we 
don’t have to postulate the existence of a so-called object named “sense”: we just have to see how 
a world could be “explained”. That is clearly the point of Philosophical Investigations §560 and 
also of the Blue Book (See quotations 7 and 8). So, according to Wittgenstein, the only way to 
“explain” a word is to show how it is used. So considering how a word is used is above all a 
therapeutics method to prevent any substantialization of the notion of “sense”.  
As an example of this method, I will quote the example of the Blue Book that describes  how to 
explain the sense of words like “chair” or “toothache” (quotation 9):  
“It is a part of the grammar of the word ‘chair’ that this is what we call ‘to sit on a chair’, and 
it is part of the grammar of the word ‘meaning’ that this is what we call ‘explanation of 
meaning’, in the same way to explain my criterion for another’s person having toothache is to 
give a grammatical explanation of the word ‘toothache’, and, in this sense, ‘an explanation 
concerning the meaning of the word ‘toothache’’”.  
 In order to explain the sense of a word like “chair” or “toothache”, we have to explain how it is 
grammatically used. As a consequence, we see that the Wittgenstein notion of “use” is introduced 
in this therapeutics context. This method now introduced, we can draw some conclusions about 
how both philosophers, that is Wittgenstein and Heidegger, differently deal with the concept of 
“use”. 
 
 Wittgenstein and Heidegger. 
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We already saw a first reason why the way Heidegger and Wittgenstein need the concept of “use” 
is not similar. According to Heidegger, “use” is an ontological category: it indicates the 
ontological structure of the readiness-to-hand. By the way, Being and Time paragraph 17 shows 
that the “signs” and specially the language signs are “derived” from the tools inasmuch as they 
have to explicit the “reference” structure of those tools. In short, Heidegger is not interested in 
how we use “signs” but in the different uses of the tools that they manifest. On the contrary, 
according to Wittgenstein, use is a grammatical concept. It coincides with the signs or 
propositions variations and “use” manifests the signs aspects variations. As a consequence, it is 
obvious that both philosophers are very sensitive to the so-called “pragmatics” dimension of 
understanding. But they develop two very different understanding of this idea of use sensitivity. 
According to Heidegger, that the way the beings are in the world that is sensitive to use. 
According to Wittgenstein, only semantics is use sensitive. That the point I now intend to 
underline: I will suggest that in the background of this discrepancy, there is two different 
conceptions of semantics. 
 
II. Two notions of semantics  
 
1/Let come back to Heidegger and to his conception of semantics. 
There are some important arguments in favour of the thesis that Heidegger has developed his own 
“philosophy of language” in the Marburg’s courses that precede Being and Time. He indeed 
proposes a radical hermeneutical reinterpretation of the aristotelician concept of logos. By the 
way, several commentators (Jean Greisch in France for instance) have underlined the pragmatics 
dimension of some of the intuitions of this philosophy of language. Following Aristotle 
distinction between “logos semantikos” and “logos apophanticos” in his 1923-24 Course about 
Aristotle but also in his 1925 Prolegomena to the history of the concept of time (§9), Heidegger 
points out that the discourse is not primary “apophantikos”, that is that all utterances of the 
discourse are not theoretical and are not evaluable as true or false. He mentions for instance 
discourses such as wishes, order, prayers, and so on. That means that Heidegger is very aware of 
the importance of non-propositional discourse and does not think that propositional discourse is 
the paradigm of every other kinds of discourse. Such critics of propositional semantics could be 
considered as a prefiguration of the linguistic realism that has been instituted in Oxford in the 
1950’s. Nevertheless, my point is that Heidegger is also very far from this linguistic realism, and 
from some Wittgenstein intuitions, precisely because, as shown before, he defends above all that 
the sense of every discourse derive from the pre-linguistic ontological sense of the world tools. 
According to me, from a Wittgenstein point of view, the hypothesis that linguistic sense is 
prefigured by a non-linguistic one is unnecessary and profoundly misleading. Wittgenstein would 
not postulate that there is something like a pre-articulated sense of the world. According to him, 
sense is only linguistic and only linguistic sense is sensitive to use. To quote the Blue Book: he is 
only interested in how we “use words in the practice” (quotation 10). 
 
2/Wittgenstein’s conception of semantics 
In order to analyse more precisely Wittgenstein’s use sensitivity semantics, I will now focus on 
Charles Travis’ reading of Wittgenstein, especially in his book The Uses of Sense, that focuses on 
the language sensitivity of use in Wittgenstein. The main purpose of Travis’ work is both to 
criticize the notion of private language and the common understanding of the notion of 
“semantics” that is predominant in the contemporary philosophy of language. To put it shortly, 
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following Wittgenstein and John Austin, he refuses to consider that the meaning of every 
utterance depends on its truth-condition. Against the truth-conditional conception of semantics, 
Travis also leans on Wittgenstein to suggest that the sense of the words depends on the way we 
use it. That is what he calls the “speaker-use sensitivity”. What does this precisely mean? 
Following Wittgenstein, it does not mean of course that we can use the words as we want without 
respecting any constraints. For instance, we have to respect some syntax principles. Some 
combinations are excluded, for instance “milk-I some sugar” has no sense (PI, §498). It is also 
obvious that it is not possible to violate the semantics sense of words. For instance, we cannot 
mean “it is warm” with the words “it is cold” (PI, §510). It seems that words wear by their own at 
least some semantics aspects. By the way, some syntactic categories (just as “verb”, “name”, etc.) 
have to be respected.  
But Wittgenstein argues that such categories are still use categories. For instance, PI §19-20 
shows that a sign like “slab” can be understood as a “word” or as a “sentence” according to the 
context. Furthermore, Wittgenstein’s fundamental point is that a sign finds its sense only when it 
is used in ordinary language. As a consequence, following Travis (quotation 11) : “It is plausible 
enough that the semantics of some items depends on their use. [He] will ultimately argue that the 
semantics of all semantics items does so”. Travis develops some example. He imagines an 
definite object (a refrigerator without any carton of milk inside but with a puddle of milk at the 
bottom of it). He then suggests that there are several ways to understand the question “is there 
some milk in the refrigerator?” referring to the same object. And these different understandings 
depend on how we use the sentence in different contexts. He imagines a first scenario:  Hugo is 
eating his breakfast and drinking his morning coffee. He asks his friend Odile: “is there some 
milk in the fridge?” In this context, Odile has to answer: no, there no milk in the fridge, which 
means no drinkable milk. But Travis imagines a second scenario: Odile had to cleaned the fridge 
and Hugo asks here the same question “is there some milk in the fridge?” (considering the same 
object) Here the answer is “yes, there is still a puddle of milk at the bottom of the fridge”. This 
example shows that it depends on how we use the “semantic items” that they have different 
meanings. Here is the Wittgenstein concept of use. “Use” indicates a grammatical variation of 
sign depending on some special context.  
 
Conclusion: the determining role of context 
 
As a conclusion, I will now put the emphasis on the fact that this conception of “use” is very 
different from Heidegger hermeneutical one. Not only because Wittgenstein’s concept of “use” 
only indicates “sign use” (which is already an important discrepancy) but also because, as Travis 
put it very clearly, Wittgenstein’s concept of “use” is a normative one, contextually determined. 
 
 
In a way, it could be tempting to say that Heidegger won’t say anything different from the above 
conclusions. I underlined above that Heidegger was also criticizing the truth-conditional concept 
of semantics in order to show that all discourse were not theoretic and truth-evaluable.  
But I hope that the last point I wish to finally underline is likely to make deeper the discrepancy 
between Heidegger hermeneutics position and Wittgenstein contextualist one. My point is indeed 
that far from defending a new form of relativism, Wittgenstein defends a strong normative 
conception. Defending that use determines the sense of our words does not mean that the sense is 
fixed up to (=selon ?) our desires, intention or life moves. From a Wittgenstein point of view 
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(which is, to my mind, a contextualist one), such uses are strongly determined in context. In 
context, we do not arbitrary decide how we use the signs of language. For instance, in the 
previous examples, if the meaning of the semantic items “is there some milk in the fridge” 
depends on how those words are used in different contexts, they are nonetheless perfectly 
determined in every context inasmuch as the context (the breakfast one or the cleaning one for 
instance) entirely determine with use is relevant or not. As Travis says “the semantics of Odile’s 
words depends, plausibly, on the circumstances of their speaking” (quotation 12). The way of 
using the words, of understanding them and of judging their relevance depends on the 
circumstances. To put it differently, it means that in circumstances there are some reasons to 
understand a word and so to be sure that another speaker will understand it in the same way. So 
use is determining but also determined. As Charles Travis put it very clearly in his 2009 book Les 
liaisons ordinaires, « il y a des usages que l’on peut raisonnablement attendre des mots […] et 
d’autres dont ce n’est pas le cas » (à traduire en anglais) (quotation 12). Those relations are 
objective inasmuch are they are contextually determined.  Those determinations are not written in 
the stone and even not necessary conventional in Wittgenstein. They are determined by previous 
practices and they are always efficient in context.  
My point is that this normative role of context distinguishes very profoundly Wittgenstein and 
Heidegger’s model of understanding. According to Wittgenstein, the meaning of the word is 
determines by the uses of the signs but such uses are strictly determines in context, inasmuch as 
the context plays a normative role. I think that the sketch is very different in Heidegger. 
According to Heidegger, the meaning of the words derives from the way we use the tools: they 
explicit, with a certain privation, their original ontological sense. That means that the criteria for 
meaning, in Heidegger, are not institutionally (or thanks practices) determined by a normative 
context. They are by the pre-normative life’s accomplishment or by the Dasein’s projects 
determined. Even if I am not disposed to conclude for all that that Heidegger’s position is a 
relativist one (at least not a subjective relativism), I want to suggest that there is a fundamental 
discrepancy between Wittgenstein’s contextualist (that is normative) conception of “use” and 
Heidegger’s ontological one: the first one is objectively determined, the second one is the 
expression of the being’s life.  
  
